In his latest book Beyond the White House, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter says, “Peace is more than just the absence of war. People everywhere seek an inner peace that comes from the right to voice their views, choose their leaders, feed their families, and raise healthy children.”
Carter’s analogy considerably fits today’s Pakistan, where the country finally is headed to a transformed military president in civvies. General Pervez Musharraf has doffed his uniform and seems ready for his role as a civilian president. He has added a new player to the nuclear-armed nations power politics in the person of General Ashfaq Kiyani, the new army chief. Musharraf is following a roadmap that he himself has charted for the restoration of what he calls “true” democracy in Pakistan.
With the country’s legitimate Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary and his brother, judges still in illegal detention, the country’s popular television channels still off air, and a largely divided opposition still thinking of a boycott after having joined the snap polls bandwagon, Pakistan is hardly at peace. But the country is not at war either.
It’s in the middle of a political and military chaos in cities and mountains in the north.
The latest developments might look favorable to Musharraf, but, in reality, these have brought more weakness than strength to his position. This is evident from the triumphant return of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from Saudi Arabia. Musharraf visited the Saudi King Abdullah as a last-ditch effort to convince him to keep Sharif out of Pakistan at least until January 8 elections, but to no avail. The Saudi King, instead of obliging the Pakistani General, rewarded his archrival by sending Sharif back to Pakistan in style – gifting him a bulletproof Mercedes Benz and lending him and his family the royal Boeing 777 for his homebound journey.
Is this an indication of Musharraf’s dwindling fortunes along with a polite snub from a foreign leader, whom Musharraf proudly calls his “elder brother?” The answer to this question cannot be a certain “yes” or “no.” What does looks certain, however, is that besides the U.S. factor in Pakistani politics, the proverbial “Saudi factor” seems to be effectively in place too.
Like the Americans, the Saudis have patiently watched Pakistani politics for the past few weeks. They saw the discredited Benazir Bhutto rise in popularity following reports of U.S. pressure on Musharraf to share power with her. Washington believed that the power share would enlarge the coalition of secular anti-fanatic forces in the country and have direct implications on the war on terror. The talk of a deal benefited Musharraf and Benazir alike. It credited Musharraf with a presidential elections process that had a semblance of legitimacy, thanks to Bhutto. It gave an opportunity to the corruption-tainted Bhutto to stage a homecoming laced with massive street power.
Politically, however, the politics of the “deal” damaged Bhutto more than Musharraf. Once both the leaders achieved their immediate objectives, they fell back to their traditional rivalry. Now the gulf between the two has reached a stage where any power-sharing deal would be no less than a miracle, for now at least.
The sole benefactor of Benazir-Musharraf deal drama was Nawaz Sharif, sitting in the safe haven of the palaces in the Saudi desert kingdom. The Saudi rulers, who oppose a woman’s rule in a Muslim country, saw an opportunity for Nawaz Sharif in the emerging political chemistry.
Although a Saudi-brokered Musharraf-Nawaz reconciliation, with Washington’s blessings, seems improbable, this possibility cannot be discounted in Pakistani politics where there are no permanent foes. Nawaz Sharif’s almost abrupt return may carry a price tag, but there is no denying the fact that he has added new weight to the emerging anti-Musharraf coalition. If this coalition announces an election boycott and takes to the streets, it will deprive the election of its only credentials – legitimacy.
Whether opposition parties boycott elections or stage a parliamentary coup by decisively winning the elections, probably Musharraf’s days are numbered. It does not matter whether Benzair Bhutto comes to power or Nawaz Sharif makes it to Pakistan’s highest office. Musharraf will see his political power weakening as the two leaders bring along the massive power of their large constituencies.
This could reduce Musharraf to a lame-duck president, keeping in view the fact that he lost his strongest constituency, the military, after doffing his uniform. He already has lost much respect among his admirers in Pakistan’s civil society, following his infamous crackdown on his natural allies under the umbrella of a state of emergency.
Washington had better start betting on Pakistan’s popular democratic leadership, independent judiciary, and free media, which hold a definite future in a country that the United States cannot afford to ignore.
Musharraf’s exit from Pakistan’s most powerful office has also left the military at a crossroads. The new military chief has the option of following in his predecessor’s missteps and press ahead with the meddling in politics – a practice that has already severely dented the Army’s image. The second option, one of sanity, demands that the military adopt its true constitutional role of a professional fighting force geared to safeguard the country’s frontiers against terrorists and trouble makers, rather than a force out to conquer its own people.
